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Online access to judicial decisions has had a dramatic impact
upon the processes of legal research routinely used by trial and
appellate lawyers. Electronic access provides a cost-effective
alternative to traditional forms of research, and even Luddites
must agree that its efficiency in providing a virtual equivalent' to
the best of our law libraries is impressive. Online research
capability results in obvious benefits to the processes of appellate
litigation and decisionmaking, such as easy access to large
quantities of relevant source material; quick access to new sources
of authority; and relative economic savings to counsel over
acquisition and maintenance of traditional law libraries. The
availability of online research capability has altered the processes
used by lawyers and judges engaging in legal research. The
advantages of online research capacity are clear. They provide the
most efficient means of confirming the current state of the law
while the substance is in flux.
Apart from reliance on online research as a substitute or
supplement to traditional modes of legal research, the flow of
information electronically suggests another potential use, one
which would fundamentally alter the process of appellate
decisionmaking. Just as publication of even "unpublished"
opinions online facilitates insight into the decisionmaking
* Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little
Rock.
1. Not all sources of law and legal comment are available online at present, and research
into highly specialized or esoteric sources may require more traditional searches, but the sheer
speed of development of online research capability has transformed the ways in which lawyers
search for legal answers and develop support for their arguments. See e.g. Lynn Foster & Bruce
Kennedy, Technological Developments in Legal Research, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 275, 281
(2000) ("For example, today LEXIS-NEXIS contains 11,400 databases, adds 8.7 million
documents each week, and has 2.1 million subscribers worldwide.").
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process, "pre-publication" of judicial opinions would facilitate
comment from beyond the appellate bench in the decisionmaking
process itself.
For example, a panel of an appellate court or the court,
sitting en banc, would simply post an opinion for public review
for a limited period of time. Formal comment or response would
be generated by the parties, interested non-parties, academic or
practitioner commentators, or the public. Following the
comment period, the panel or the court would then have time to
reconsider its proposed disposition and supporting rationale in
light of the responses offered. The opinion could then be issued
in final form, withdrawn and modified, or withdrawn with a
different decision substituted.'
Reconsideration of initial dispositions has traditionally
been the heart of the rehearing process.4 The previewing of
opinions would transform the process from one in which
reconsideration is conducted as a private exercise between the
litigating parties and the panel or court issuing the opinion into a
more public process. Formalization of this process would
constitute a dramatic change in the way appellate courts work,
but informal previewing is already occurring.
2. One example is noted by Judge Richard S. Arnold of the Eighth Circuit in his essay,
Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 219 (1999). The availability of
unpublished opinions through online research sources seemingly undermines the utility and
rationale behind the designation of some opinions as not to be published. Moreover, in a recent
decision, Anastasoff v. U.S., 2000 WL 1182813 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 2000), Judge Arnold's
opinion for the panel held the Eighth Circuit rule forbidding citation to unpublished opinions
was violative of the judicial power set forth in Article Inl of the United States Constitution.
3. Something similar to this process may be used by trial judges when proposed orders are
made available to counsel for objection or comment before being finalized. See Clarification,
68 U.S.L.W. 1352 (Dec. 14, 1999), correcting an earlier report on Los Angeles Times v. Free
Republic, 68 U.S.L.W. 1335 (Dec. 7, 1999), to reflect that the trial court had forwarded its
proposed order in case to both counsel for objections prior to rendering final decision.
4. For example, in Clemmons v. Delo, the court granted the rehearing petition and
ordered relief in a capital habeas action, explaining:
Two principal concerns led us to take the unusual step of granting rehearing by
the panel. First, the petition for rehearing pointed out that, contrary to our earlier
view, petitioner had in fact presented evidence crucial to his Confrontation
Clause claim to the state post-conviction court. Second, we had not properly
understood Missouri evidence law, a mistake that caused our analysis of the
prejudice caused by the Brady violation to be flawed.




The publication or dissemination of opinions online has
resulted in a digital analog to the process known to lawyers in
which opinions published in the advance sheets are withdrawn,
changed or modified before final publication in the bound copy
of a reporter. For example, a reader perusing volume 208 of the
Federal Reporter, Third Series, will find the following notation
at page 1246:
Editor's Note: The opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in Blackhawk-Central City
Sanitation Dist. v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins.
Co., published in the advance sheet at this citation, 208
F.3d 1246, was withdrawn from the bound volume because
opinion was ordered withdrawn, judgment was vacated,
and modified opinion was filed May 31, 2000.'
Once appellate opinions are posted online as they are
issued, any alteration of the initial disposition can be traced
electronically. This is much the same as the inclusion of a note
regarding the withdrawal of an opinion from the bound volume,
which indicates that the initial opinion printed in an advance
sheet or other format has been divested of precedential value in
the traditional publication process. The rapid dissemination of
opinions in an electronic format simply makes this process much
more immediate because there is no lapse of time in the
publication of an opinion in print format, whether disseminated
directly by the clerk's office or through advance sheets. Not
only does electronic publication improve public access, but it
also generates some degree of uncertainty in the development of
the law. The online histories of three cases illustrate this point.
A. Tasini v. New York Times Co.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
posted its opinion online in Tasini v. New York Times Co.6
following issuance of its decision on September 24, 1999. The
case involved an important question of copyright law: whether an
5. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 208
F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2000).
6. 1999 WL 753966 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 1999).
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author retains copyright interest in an article originally published
as a "freelance" piece when it is disseminated in electronic
databases available to the public. The district court ruled for the
defendants in the action based on the characterization of these
freelance articles as "collective works" of the defendant
publishers.7 The Second Circuit issued an opinion reversing and
remanding, ordering that judgment be issued for the appellant
authors.'
Far from conclusively deciding the issue at the time,
however, the Second Circuit's decision initially posted on
Westlaw included the notation that the opinion earlier published
in the advance sheets had been withdrawn from the bound
volume. The editor's note warned:
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, in Tasini v. New York Times Co., Inc., published
in the advance sheet at this citation, 192 F.3d 356, was
withdrawn from the bound volume at the request of the
court. A superseding opinion may be filed at a later date.9
In fact the court did issue a superseding opinion in the case,
on February 25, 2000,' ° and the Second Circuit again reversed,
ordering summary judgment entered for the complaining authors."
The published history of this decision indicates that counsel,
relying on the advance sheet publication and failing to confirm the
continuing viability of the opinion through a search of online
sources, might well have missed the fact that the circuit formally
expressed reservations with its original -opinion and ordered it
withdrawn from the bound volume. While the court did not alter
its disposition after reconsidering its initial published opinion, it
might well have; in failing to check an online source rather than
7. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
8. Rendition of judgment by the appellate court appears clearly appropriate in light of the
Supreme Court's holding last term in Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000), in
which the Court held that an appellate court may reverse and render judgment in a proper case,
consistent with Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
9. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 1999 WL 753966 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 1999) (emphasis
added). The text of the initial panel opinion is no longer available on Westlaw. In fact, the
current Westlaw version does not even include the language that appeared in the initial
publication.
10. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 2000 WL 273942 (2d Cir. 2000). A
Westlaw search of the prior Westlaw citation will indicate that a new opinion had been issued
in the case and the text of the initial opinion had been deleted from the database.
11. Tasini, 206 F.3d at 171-72.
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simply relying on the advance sheets, counsel would likely have
missed the court's action altogether unless by chance she had
noticed that the original opinion was not included in the bound
volume once it arrived.
The Second Circuit's withdrawal of its initial opinion in
Tasini and replacement with an opinion substantially similar in
holding would not have had profound consequences for
practitioners relying on the panel's first effort, or perhaps, those
practitioners forced to address the holding as adverse to the
interests of their clients. The substituted opinion did not serve to
change the disposition significantly, so that the primary impact on
the appellate process was the uncertainty in the development of the
law indicated by the cautionary note accompanying the opinion as
initially published. A different concern is implicated when the
rehearing process results in a direct change in disposition that
alters the position of the parties in the litigation. Unlike technical
or grammatical changes, which may not inure to the detriment of a
party, substantive changes are far more significant in the rehearing
process.'2 This problem is suggested by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's treatment of witness bias in federal
prosecutions resulting from prosecution agreements with
witnesses which might influence them to testify on behalf of the
government.
12. The rehearing process is often a poor means of ensuring justice. Consider the case of
Aguirre v. State, 732 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The case remained on the rehearing
docket forfive years before the opinion originally issued was reversed by the court. Id at 324.
The published opinion incorrectly notes that Judge Clinton authored both the original reversal
and the opinion on rehearing in the synopsis; in fact, Judge McCormick authored the opinion
on rehearing, and Judge Clinton dissented. The delay resulted in issuance of an intervening
opinion in Murphy v. State, 665 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), which was inconsistent
with the original opinion in Aguirre and ultimately led to affirmance of the trial court on
rehearing. See Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 256-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (discussing
Aguirre and noting the five-year delay). Such an extended period of delay in which conflicting
holdings were issued by the same court hardly suggests that rehearing is always a satisfactory
process for resolving questions about the accuracy of an initial ruling.
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B. United States v. Singleton
In Singleton, a panel of the Tenth Circuit held that federal
legislation barred the use of testimony procured by conferring a
benefit on the witness in return for his testimony.
3
Prosecutors panicked when suddenly faced with an inability
to use cash, dismissals, immunity, sentencing leniency, or witness
protection to procure testimony. The prosecutors' concern was
almost laughable for defense counsel who often cannot get
subpoenas served on key witnesses who may themselves face
exposure to liability and then confront assertion of Fifth
Amendment claims when the witnesses are brought to court.
Ultimately, of course, the full Tenth Circuit overruled the panel
holding and restored prosecutorial discretion to its proper place in
the universe. 4 The balance, or imbalance, of power in the
subpoena process was restored through rehearing. The same result
could have been obtained with perhaps less distress had the panel
opinion initially been previewed for comment, permitting
thoughtful input from prosecutors, academics, and interested
parties-before the publication of the panel opinion launched a
flood of motions in limine throughout federal and state court
systems relying on the panel opinion in Singleton. However, the
potential uncertainty in the viability of the panel's decision was
almost immediately made known to practitioners because the
circuit court granted en banc review within ten days after release
of the panel opinion."
13. U.S. v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998). The text of the panel opinion is no
longer available on Westlaw. An attempt to locate the opinion results in the notification that the
"document is not included in any Westlaw database." However, the panel opinion is published
in the bound volume of the reporter and may still be located there, with the notation that the
Circuit Court granted rehearing and ordered the panel opinion vacated.
14. U.S. v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024 (1999). The en
banc circuit court said: "From the common law, we have drawn a longstanding practice
sanctioning the testimony of accomplices against their confederates in exchange for
leniency .... This engrained practice of granting lenience in exchange for testimony has created
a vested sovereign prerogative in the government." Id at 1301.
15. The order granting rehearing en banc is published at 144 F.3d 1361, following the
published panel opinion.
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C. Dodd v. State
Something similar to the situation in Singleton recently
happened in Oklahoma and also suggests the suitability of
formalizing previewing of appellate opinions. 6 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals released an opinion in Dodd v. State,7
which also addressed the prosecution's use of witnesses whose
motivation for testifying was subject to serious question. Dodd
was convicted of a capital murder and sentenced to death, in part
based on the testimony of a jailhouse informant who later recanted
his testimony, and then recanted his recantation. 8 In reversing, the
court held that the trial court had erred in excluding two
potentially impeaching letters written concerning the informant's
motivation to testify because they had not been disclosed by
defense counsel in the discovery process. The appellate court
observed:
Courts should be exceedingly leery of jailhouse informants,
especially if there is a hint that the informant received some
sort of a benefit for his or her testimony. This problem is
even greater here when we look at the error that is
discussed above as to the withdrawal of the statements by
the informant and what the informant has to say about
promises made to the informant. The Court should look to
how many times the informant has testified before for the
District Attorney's office. Here we have two very clear
letters that may or may not be true but should have been in
evidence. Consequently, under the unique circumstances of
16. See Special Discovery Scheme, Jury Instruction Required When Jailhouse Informer to
Testify, 68 U.S.L.W. 1436 (Feb. 1, 2000).
17. 1999 OK CR 29, 1999 WL 521976. The text of this opinion is no longer available on
Westlaw, nor is it available on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' website. See OCCA
Online: Opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals (accessed Sept. 24, 2000) <http://www.
oscn.net/datafiles/legal/oklahoma/caselaw/criminal/1999/1999%200K%20CR%2029.htm>.
18. Dodd v. State, 2000 OK CR 2, % 15, 993 P.2d 778, 782:
After Dodd's preliminary hearing, Bryant recanted his testimony that Dodd had
admitted killing the victims. The recantation occurred during an interview with
investigators for another capital murder case. Bryant later reasserted the
truthfulness of his original testimony. Bryant testified at trial about his
recantation and the circumstances surrounding the recantation. Bryant explained
that he told the investigator "what she wanted to hear" in hope that she would
arrange for him to get an O.R. bond so he could get out of jail and return to his
dying wife.
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this case, we find Dodd's murder conviction must be
reversed. 19
In a special concurrence, Judge Chapel set forth a specific set
of guidelines to be followed by the state's trial judges in
considering admission of testimony offered by jailhouse
informants.0 This rule-making in the context of an announced
opinion would have dramatically changed admissibility procedure
in a way necessarily requiring immediate understanding on the
part of trial judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel.
But the Dodd opinion was not finalized upon its release
online. In fact, the opinion carried a notation to that effect:
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED
FOR PUBLICATION REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT
IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
2 1
And the opinion was subsequently withdrawn b X order of the
court once it granted the state's motion for rehearing.
The Oklahoma court then reissued its opinion, again
reversing the capital conviction.23 The reissued opinion left intact
the majority's observations concerning the use of jailhouse
informants.4 In the reissued opinion the majority adopted the
procedure for admission of an informant/witness's testimony to be
19. Dodd, 1999 OK CR 29,9122, 1999 WL 521976 at *5.
20. Id.at in 1-6, 1999 WL 521976 at **7-8 (Chapel, J., concurring). The text of Judge
Chapel's concurrence is no longer available on Westlaw, nor is it available on the Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals' website.
21. Dodd, 1999 OK CR 29, 1999 WL 521976.
22. Dodd v. State, 1999 WL 907406 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 1999). The court's
withdrawal stated, in pertinent part:
On July 22, 1999, we issued an Opinion in this matter wherein we reversed both
murder convictions and remanded for new trial. See Dodd v. State, 1999 OK CR
29, -P.2d-. The State of Oklahoma filed a Petition for Rehearing on August
10, 1999.
Upon consideration of the matters raised in the Petition for Rehearing, we find
rehearing should be, and hereby is, GRANTED. We further find the Opinion,
including the Special Concurring Opinion and Dissent, issued July 22, 1999,
should be, and hereby is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Id. at * 1. The text of this order is no longer available on Westlaw.
23. Dodd v. State, 2000 OK CR 2, 993 P.2d 778.
24. Id. at 122, 993 P.2d at783. See supra n. 18 and accompanying text.
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used to facilitate discovery and cross-examination" that previously
had only been articulated in Judge Chapel's concurring opinion.26
Although the court adopted, in part, the procedure advocated
initially in Judge Chapel's special concurrence, effectively
engaging in an important act of judicial rule-making in the
process, it was not as far-reaching in terms of the trial court's
exercise of discretion in determining admissibility of this type of
evidence. In his concurrence, Judge Chapel would have required
not only disclosure of information about the informant designed to
facilitate cross-examination, but also would have imposed a duty
on trial courts to make preliminary determinations about the
reliability of the proffered testimony, reviewable for abuse of
discretion."
25. Id. U 24-26, 993 P.2d at 784.
26. Supra note 19.
27. Vice-Presiding Judge Lumpkin dissented in part, objecting to the court's rule making in
violation of the authority granted to the legislature and its prior enactment of the discovery code
governing disclosures prior to trial. Dodd, 2000 OK CR 2, 1 7, 2000 WL 12030 at *9.
28. The process advanced in Judge Chapel's concurring opinion included:
15 Prior to trial, the judge shall conduct a reliability hearing. At the reliability
hearing, the reviewing court should evaluate the evidence by hearing the
testimony of the informant, any other relevant witness (including possibly the
defendant), and any evidence bearing on the informant's credibility. The judge
shall specifically consider the following factors: (1) whether the informant has
received or will receive anything in exchange for testifying; (2) whether the
informant has testified or offered evidence in other cases and any benefit there
received; (3) the specificity of the informant's testimony; (4) the manner in
which the statement from the defendant was obtained; (5) the degree to which
the statement can be independently corroborated; (6) whether the informant has
changed his testimony in this case or any case; and (7) the informant's criminal
history.
6 After considering the evidence, the judge should determine whether the
moving party established that the informant's testimony is more probably true
than not. If not, the testimony should be excluded. If so, the testimony should be
admitted, leaving as a final safeguard any lingering questions on the witness's
credibility to the jury. In all cases where a court admits jailhouse informant
testimony, OUJI-CR CR 9-43 (amended as follows) shall be given: The
testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant must be
examined and weighed by you with greater care than the testimony of an
ordinary witness. Whether the informer's testimony has been affected by interest
or prejudice against the defendant is for you to determine. In making that
determination, you should consider: (1) whether the witness has received
anything (including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution,
personal advantage, or vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case
in which the informant testified or offered statements against an individual but
was not called, and whether the statements were admitted in the case, and
whether the defendant received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in
exchange for that testimony or statement; (3) whether the informant has ever
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The brief history of the appellate litigation in Dodd
demonstrates how online publication of judicial opinions virtually
invites change in the way the process will work in the future.
The process reflected informally in Dodd may ultimately be
formalized in a system permitting previewing of opinions. In
contrast to Singleton, the opinion initially released in Dodd
expressly advised counsel and the public that the court had yet to
finalize its position, thus cautioning against reliance on the opinion
as mandatory. Informally or formally, however, a trial court could
adopt the court's approach in its exercise of discretion when
confronted with an admissibility issue relating to jailhouse
informant testimony. There is no suggestion that the Dodd court
"previewed" its opinion in order to assess official and public
reaction prior to finalizing its holding. But the use of online
"previewing" will permit formalization of a broader range of
input than readily available now through the rehearing process.
The decision to formalize previewing by integrating this approach
into the rehearing process requires consideration of the advantages
and disadvantages of input from interested parties other than the
litigants in this phase of the proceedings.
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PREVIEWING
A. Advantages
The suggested process of "previewing" decisions online
would clearly break with tradition in which appellate
decisionmaking is a private enterprise. 9 However, for the judges,
law clerks, and staff attorneys assigned to work on a particular
case, it would offer the potential for certain discrete advantages
often compromised or ignored by privacy concerns.
changed his or her testimony; (4) the criminal history of the informant; and (5)
any other evidence relevant to the informer's credibility.
17 The admission of such testimony shall be reviewed on appeal to determine
whether abuse of discretion occurred. These requirements shall be applied
prospectively to cases awaiting trial.
Dodd, 1999 OK CR 29, R 5-7, 1999 WL 521976 at **8-9 (Chapel, J., concurring) (internal
citations omitted). The text of this opinion is no longer available on Westlaw.
29. As in "cloaked in secrecy," rather than an enterprise undertaken for profit.
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1. Openness
First, this process would transform appellate decisionmaking
from a secretive into an open process. Just as administrative
agencies engaging in rule-making formally request comment from
interested parties and the public prior to adopting new or
modifying existing regulations, this period of comment would
permit comment on proposed "final" opinions of the court. For
the overwhelming majority of cases, the "preview" will result in
little prospect for input except by counsel most involved with the
case or type of case being decided. Many appeals simply do not
pose novel issues generating widespread interest or comment
because they will pass through the process in virtual anonymity,
whether in paper or digital format. Cases which do involve
significant or novel claims, however, could benefit from general
scrutiny-in the same way that amicus curiae representation often
brings to bear important points of view, supporting arguments or
particularized information on the process. 3° Where dispositions
will have important impact on society beyond that on the parties,
input concerning social or economic implications is critical to
ensuring that a single appellate court ruling does not alter public
policy or private decisionmaking to the unfair detriment of
individuals, enterprises, or communities not parties to the action."
Online previewing would permit those interests to be expressed
and at least considered by the court before a proposed disposition
and opinion are finalized and issued, and at considerably less cost
than in the typical additional representation required by the amicus
process.
2. Accuracy
Second, if correct decisionmaking is the most important
function of the appellate court, then improving accuracy would be
the most important consequence of opening the decisionmaking
30. See e.g. Luther T. Munford, When Does the Curiae Need an Amicus?, I J. App. Prac.
& Process 279 (1999) (summarizing role and benefits of amicus curiae representation in
appellate courts).
3 1. A classic example of this potential for harm is seen in Justice Marshall's opinion for the
majority in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), in which he declined to find an adequate
record before the Court upon which to make fundamental decisions about the treatment of
alcoholism and intoxication in the criminal justice system.
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process for public comment. "Correct" decisionmaking does not
necessarily mean that the court essentially got the answer "right,"
as law professors often suggest, but more. It suggests that the right
answer was given for the right reasons.32 Appellate courts
frequently answer questions with right answers, but not
necessarily for the right reasons, a fact which results in concurring
opinions and opinions distinguishing the bases for holdings.
Similarly, even right reasoning often leads to an incorrect or
wrong result which sometimes requires reversal, overruling, or
another sign of formal disapproval. "Correct" decisionmaking
contemplates the range of substantive and procedural criteria by
which lawyers and judges assess the quality of the process. In
other words, the decisionmaking process may be improved
because the appellate court would have the advantage of a range of
professional and, possibly, lay opinion that would inform its work.
Many appellate opinions are flawed by incorrect references
to facts or the procedural history of a case, but these flaws do not
require a change in the court's ruling. Instead, they prove to be
fodder for rehearing motions and usually unsuccessful petitions for
discretionary review or certiorari. In this sense, they may pose
their greatest danger as irritants for the parties and counsel in the
case. Attentive counsel offering comment on the proposed opinion
and pointing to the error in interpreting the factual record below
could readily correct these flaws. Once published or formally
issued, in the context of an unpublished opinion, correction of
these flaws is unlikely because there is ultimately too little value in
making the correction in light of the fact that the correction will
have no effect on the disposition.
But accuracy has a certain value, apart from prejudice, and
the only certain way to build in corrective process for the potential
for human error in the processing of large caseloads by judges,
panels of judges, staff attorneys, law clerks, and law student
externs, who all may be involved in the decisionmaking process, is
32. Often, appellate courts affirm rulings made by trial courts which are correct, but not for
the reasons given in the course of the proceedings below. See e.g. Drummond v. Drummond,
1997-NMCA-094, 9112, 945 P.2d 457, 461:
C. Affirming the District Court Under Right-For-Wrong-Reason Doctrine
12. Despite the fact that the legal rationale used by the district court was
erroneous, we may affirm the court's decision if it is right for any reason and
affirming on a different ground would not be unfair to the appellant.
REDEFINING REHEARING
to permit the parties most interested in the dispute to advise the
court prior to issuance of the decision. Even a party destined to
lose has some right to expect accuracy when an appellate court
deals with an issue of primary significance to the party. When the
court fails to state the facts correctly, it disappoints that party by
suggesting that the court may have also erred in more significant
contexts. A system that relies on public confidence should not
quickly dismiss the perception created by its own failings,
particularly when some of these failings could readily be
addressed.
More importantly, when a potential error would prejudice a
party, the screening of dispositions would afford correction
without requiring the losing party to establish the degree of harm
essential for rehearing or discretionary review. This is important
because the announcement of the decision, particularly when
published, serves a critical function apart from the determination
as to which party should prevail. It becomes a statement of law,
and the party bearing the burden on rehearing or discretionary
review must often show not only that an error has been made, but
that there is an additional cost to the legal system from letting the
announced ruling stand. When the panel or court correctly states
the rule or principle of law, and its application would be correct,
were the underlying facts properly understood, the losing party
may have a more difficult time in showing that the ruling should
be withdrawn. The error in assessing the underlying facts to which
the principle has otherwise been correctly applied simply will not
warrant correction.
Of course, when the panel or court has not correctly
interpreted the rule, the virtue of previewing the opinion is greatly
increased because external comment can assist the court in
avoiding issuance of a decision marred by a doctrinally incorrect
result.33 A legally incorrect disposition may occur with less
33. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court, sitting en banc, improperly concluded that
for purposes of ex post facto analysis, the sentencing law on the date of sentencing would
control the sentencing options available, rather than the sentencing law effective on the date of
the offense. Davis v. Mabry, 585 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Ark. 1979) (en banc). Five years later, in
Bosnick v. Lockhart, 677 S.W.2d 292 (Ark. 1984), the court acknowledged its error, citing the
controlling legislation, Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 43-2829 (Bobbs-Merrill Repl.
1977) and the intervening holding in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). Bosnick, 677
S.W.2d at 292. The Supreme Court traced the rule through a series of decisions to Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798), noting the holding in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810):
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frequency than the factual error which otherwise might not
warrant a different holding. Previewing decisions to ensure
accuracy in legal theory, which would permit input from other
sources before finalization of a panel or court opinion, would be
preferable to a system in which correction can only be made
through the formal processes of rehearing or further appellate
review.
3. Facilitating settlement
The pre-publication of dispositions and opinions online
would undoubtedly facilitate settlement negotiations that are now
often conducted by counsel who rely on mere guesses about the
tendencies of an appellate panel and their own assessments of the
strength of their supporting legal authority. If a court's
predisposition is disclosed, however, a client can be rationally
counseled about the prospects for continuing litigation which may
be futile and expensive. Previewing also means, of course, that in
many cases counsel will be able to advise against settlement
pending final disposition of the appeal, because the element of
uncertainty that prompts negotiation and compromise will be
almost completely reduced once the proposed disposition is
disclosed online. But this happens anyway once a decision is
issued; the "preview" would facilitate settlement avoiding
publication of a formal opinion that in many cases entails future
costs for a client or similarly situated parties because precedent is
thereby established.
Openness, accuracy, and facilitation of settlement, then,
may be said to be three potential advantages flowing from the
recognition of a technologically-enhanced rehearing process.
Clearly, this approach, if formalized, would change the nature of
judicial decisionmaking and interject public consideration of
proposed decisions in the process. To the extent that appellate
decisions should reflect the best exercise of legal thinking
available, previewing an appellate court's decision and
"An ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not
punishable when it was committed." 450 U.S. at 28 n. 9. The Arkansas court's correction in
Bosnick occurred in an opinion denying a petition for rehearing in which counsel had expressly
requested clarification on this precise issue. Bosnick, 677 S.W.2d at 292.
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supporting opinion may offer distinct advantages. But these are
likely not without cost.
B. Disadvantages
The most serious danger to the integrity of the appellate
process would be the perception that appellate judges will no
longer function independently of political pressure. Many
lawyers and citizens undoubtedly hold that opinion already.
Nevertheless, the danger of loss of public and professional
confidence is perhaps so significant that any formalization of a
process for previewing judicial decisions should be undertaken
with great caution.
Nevertheless, traditional concerns for the integrity of the
appellate process will be voiced in opposition to the
formalization of any process in which judicial decisionmaking is
fundamentally altered to reflect a more democratic, or legislative
process. In effect, online previewing of appellate opinions would
seem to merge the traditionally distinct lines between rule-
making, in which public comment is invited, and adjudication,
in which settled rules are applied to resolve factual disputes.
Democratization offers the benefit of public input, of course, but
at the potential cost of permitting majoritarianism to dominate
the branch charged with protecting individual rights and
interests from majority oppression.
But inviting public consideration of pending dispositions and
opinions offers perhaps the worst of both worlds. It will invite
appellate fact-finding if courts are not careful with regard to the
information they consider in the process. Furthermore, much
information may not actually provide additional insight into the
way in which cases are decided. If the chief objection to the
prospect of online previewing of decisions lies in the very threat of
input from diverse sources into the decisionmaking process, then
the process itself might afford a measure of protection. When
comment is public and available to the community generally,
citizens can determine what pressures have prompted a change in
thinking on the part of a panel or court, rather than having the
process shrouded in traditional notions of formality which
inevitably involve secrecy. In this sense, the formalization of the
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process of public comment may serve to prevent private, non-
disclosed comment from influencing appellate courts.
In terms of public perception, recognition of a role for public
comment may also lead to the unfortunate belief that appellate
judges will abandon dispassionate enforcement of legal principle
in favor of publicly acceptable positions on important issues.
Concern over public perception of the motivation of actors in the
process undoubtedly factors into the decision to televise court
proceedings.34 These concerns also demand secrecy in the
disposition of Supreme Court decisions that makes public
disclosure of the inner workings of the Court so disturbing for
many in the legal community. What is likely true, however, is that
many of our most able legal thinkers and jurists might not choose
service on the Court out of simple concern for personal shyness or
privacy. This is not an insignificant consideration for justices who
do not risk public exposure by voluntarily running for elected
office, including judgeships, but appointees to the Court are
already subjected to substantial media exposure during the
appointment and confirmation process. Perhaps our recent national
experience with televised conflict in the process alone justifies the
Court's continued aversion to media coverage of its public
functions. Ironically, the decisions of the Supreme Court, as the
final court of last resort, are those least likely to benefit from
previewing. At that level, the issues have typically been fully
34. These concerns still keep cameras out of many courtrooms, and often for good reason,
because the conduct of trials should not be altered by considerations of public exposure of the
process. While trials, particularly those conducted before citizen-jurors serving as fact-finders,
might need to be shielded from public scrutiny which may intimidate citizens in the
deliberative process, appellate courts might easily be distinguished as forums for public
viewing. To the extent that appellate judges are concerned with application of law to facts and
not redetermination of facts already found below, televised oral arguments would appear to
promote public access to an important function of our governmental system with rather obvious
educational benefits, provided the judges are capable of performing well on camera.
Exclusion of television from the United States Supreme Court represents a reaction,
perhaps, to long-held concerns that introduction of technology designed to expand public
access may compromise the Court's ability to do its work. But exclusion of cameras from
the Court cannot be justified on the usually compelling grounds that jurors and witnesses in
high-profile trials should neither be influenced nor compromised by public exposure on
television. Furthermore, the Justices are professionals at the pinnacle of power who should
hardly be influenced by the minimal intrusion that televised proceedings would actually
pose.
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litigated, and the Court's posture as policy maker is often subject
to the inclinations of the Justices themselves. 5
Once decisions of even the Supreme Court are released for
online dissemination, control over the process has been altered in
somewhat the same way that digital communication is
revolutionizing other aspects of our social, commercial, and
political life. The legal system cannot realistically endorse the
benefits of online research without sacrificing the tradition of
bound volumes. Nor can it expect the appellate process to remain
the same in its core approach to decisionmaking while other
aspects of the litigation process, such as the processing of briefs,
de-emphasis on oral argument, and increasing use of support staff
to process cases, change to reflect demands for efficiency
attributable to increasing caseloads.
The suggestion that integrity of the process will necessarily
be compromised by formalizing the opportunity for public and
professional comment may well raise a straw man; it reflects
reliance on the system, rather than the personal integrity of the
decisionmakers, as guarantor of integrity. As will almost all
technological change, threats posed in terms of issues of integrity
should first address the ultimate moral responsibility of those who
adopt new technologies or innovations, rather than viewing the
technology itself as an inherent threat to integrity. Previewing of
appellate decisions will undoubtedly change the nature of that
decisionmaking process to afford greater, and broader, input into
the process. But this will happen when any casual or interested
reader of an online decision not yet finalized takes the opportunity
to comment directly to the court. Oddly, the professional rules
under which attorneys operate may serve to insulate appellate
courts from unsolicited comment by counsel who lack standing
while permitting non-attorneys the option of expressing their
concerns directly to appellate judges.
This may result in unintended pressures being brought to bear
on judges deciding the most controversial of cases. For instance,
the public pressure brought to bear on a court which reverses a
criminal conviction in a particularly notorious case, such as the
reversal of a capital conviction or sentence of death, as happened
35. But in the case of Powell v. Texas, the litigation had not so thoroughly developed
important facts and longer range policy implications of the alternative course of action
available to the Court, as Justice Marshall noted. Powell, 392 U.S. at 522.
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in Dodd,36 or grant of new trial in a case involving a child
molester, may threaten the professional position of those judges
involved in the decision. This prospect might support
appointment, rather than election of state appellate judges, of
course, but the threat of undue influence being brought to bear
through online previewing appears to be as great when public
pressure is brought to bear through conventional means. Yet, the
threat is more substantial, because public disapproval of appellate
decisions typically can only occur once a decision is formally
entered. Then, pressure can only result in a reconsideration if the
court grants rehearing and vacates its earlier decision.
"Previewing" poses the distinct possibility that such pressure
could routinely influence judges not to make controversial or
politically sensitive decisions precisely because the initial
publication of the decision is not even intended to be final.
The tendency to compromise judicial independence has
undoubtedly already happened; online access to judicial
decisionmaking simply makes the process of dissemination of
information more efficient and less costly. Because it would
encourage public comment on judicial decisionmaking, the
inherent risk is that formal comment on proposed decisions will
improperly influence judges to reach politically acceptable, but
legally improper decisions. One way to address this tendency
would be to require a court altering its position to state its reasons
for a change from the original disposition, something that may be
done in the traditional rehearing process. Balanced against this
considerable cost to just appellate review is the benefit for more
input from a knowledgeable and interested bar and public which
may lead to better-reasoned decisions.
In this context, the previewing of decisions may suggest a
legitimacy in considering public opinion in the finalizing of
judicial decisions which would be inappropriate. Clearly, the role
of the judiciary is to protect individual rights and interests from
oppression by the majority, and traditionally, the judicial process
is not a legislative process in which public preference offers a
36. The appellate court noted that the trial court had concluded, in its required report
concerning the conviction and sentence, that the evidence did not foreclose all doubt about the
defendant's guilt, and that the trial judge concluded that "the jury was influenced by passion or
prejudice or other arbitrary factors in imposing the sentence." Dodd v. State, 2000 OK CR 2,
20, 993 P.2d 778, 783.
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basis for policy decisions. The potential for corruption of judicial
independence is not a necessary consequence of technological
innovation, even though it poses the threat that judges will hesitate
to judge properly in light of public outcry.
But the potential for improper influence in the judicial
process does not necessarily mean that the process will, in fact, be
compromised. After all, the Dodd Court appears to have withstood
any public objection which might have followed its initial reversal
and reiterated its position that the error committed by the trial
court required a new trial.
A weighing of the advantages and disadvantages in retooling
the rehearing process will not necessarily suggest that previewing
is desirable. But what is clear is that technological developments
lend themselves to rapid change, which is not always well thought
out or the product of rational choice. Regardless of whether the
process is formalized, recent history suggests that electronic
dissemination of judicial opinions has, in fact, reshaped the
rehearing process in terms of access, if not in terms of input. The
informal process described in the three case histories discussed
earlier suggests one critical problem for formalization of
previewing as a component of rehearing: Initial opinions should,
perhaps must, remain posted online so that counsel, scholars, and
the public can readily trace the progress of decisionmaking in an
individual case. Once initial opinions are withdrawn and otherwise
generally unavailable, the ability to understand where and why a
court has withdrawn or overruled an initial disposition is
compromised and may, effectively, be lost.
Moreover, in order to make an online system for rehearing
workable, as suggested in this essay, it will be important for the
appellate briefs filed in an individual case, as well as the
appendices, and other material excerpted from the record on
appeal, to be accessible in the same online format. This will
provide context for any comment offered in response to a
proposed decision posted online.
III. CONCLUSION
In a society now driven by economic interests fueled by
technological innovation, the application of technological change
to traditional modes of decisionmaking, including judicial
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decisionmaking, seems highly likely. Because the use of online
previewing to enhance accuracy in the appellate process seems
reasonable, others will undoubtedly suggest it. The threat to the
integrity of the judicial process will lie in the tendency to conclude
that regularity and predictability necessarily further the interests of
justice. These concerns may actually represent only the drive for
utilitarian or pluralistic harmony that sacrifices individual liberties
for a greater economic good. Rather than embracing technology as
an end, the independent judiciary will be forced to impose
traditional concerns for constitutional rights and legal values on
this potential tool for a more effective process.
As with many technological developments, the pace of
change may drive policy, rather than be directed by it. Those who
embrace application of new technologies to the legal system will
be able to advance strong arguments in favor of changing
appellate practice and decisionmaking to accommodate these new
modes of communication. In the end, those of us who favor a
quieter, slower pace of decisionmaking and traditional values-
which attach more readily to a process exemplifying social norms
of nineteenth and twentieth century practitioners than to the more
economically efficient promises of the twenty-first-will
eventually be left to reflect on the words of Henry Drummond in
Inherit the Wind:
(Turning to the jury, reasonably) Gentlemen, progress has
never been a bargain. You've got to pay for it. Sometimes I
think there's a man behind a counter who says, "All right,
you can have a telephone; but you'll have to give up
privacy, the charm of distance. Madam, you may vote; but
at a price; you lose the right to retreat behind a powder-puff
or a petticoat. Mister, you may conquer the air; but the
birds will lose their wonder, and the clouds will smell of
gasoline!" "
37. Jerome Lawrence & Robert E. Lee, Inherit the Wind 83 (Bantam Pathfinder ed. 1964).
